I’d like to clarify that in this article, I am referring to abrahamic religions.
Religion, particularly abrahamic traditions, has often been treated as a stand-in for morality; many believers understand moral authority as rooted in divine command. While it provides a clear ethical framework, it limits independent moral reasoning, recalls the filters on AI chatbots and is more adapted as an intro to morality to those like children who are too young to understand it.
One issue with equating religion and morality is that it can discourage critical thinking. When moral laws are seen as absolute because they hail from the absolute authority of God, in his ‘ever loving’ nature, questioning them may be viewed as wrong and sinful. This would make it difficult to grow ethical views in response to changing knowledge and social views. For example, the practice of holding human chattel (slaves) and strict social structures were once justified through religion, however now those same religious institutions renounce their predecessors, widely recognising that their actions are immoral.
Ultimately, treating religion as a substitute for morality is dense.
However, it can be seen as having the function of a simulacrum of morality in the sense described by Baudrillard (Simulacra refers to a copy without an original). In the 1970s, Baudrillard argued that simulacra occur when society engages with representations of truth rather than truth itself, and these representations ultimately become a symbol of the truth once they are represented. Similarly, rather than being morality itself, religion can operate as a representation that gradually replaces genuine ethical reasoning. As time passes, the adherence to religious rules may come to signify moral goodness, regardless of the consequences of those actions.
In this framework, morality becomes performance as actions are no longer weighed against their impact but rather measured for how closely they conform with doctrine. The symbol of morality – religious obedience – thus takes precedence over the substance of morality.
I would argue that the hatred of man comes less from the oppression of women, but from the narrative used to justify their oppression as a form of protection. We all know well enough the misogyny inherent in abrahamic religions – an example of this is the policing of women’s bodies under the guise of ‘modesty’ (for example burkas, hijabs, wigs and veils). Usually, the reason given for this is that men cannot control themselves around the wantonness of a shoulder, hair or the intimate female voice (Taliban vice and virtue law). The rule serves one primary purpose: it gives the male assaulter a reason to blame the victim of their their rape, assault or harassment by likening them to animals like pigs or other beasts without self control, drawn to violence against women by nature. This would also justify the hatred some women feel towards men. The nature of this issue is systemic, in such if it were to be solved, it must be solved by those who set up the system, that being the patriarchy that functions on the premise that men are superior but paradoxically incapable of constraint when faced with what seems like the herculean task of passing a drunk girl in a short skirt without harming her. The patriarchy is almost synonymous with abrahamic religions as all of them preach the submission of women: “Wives, submit yourselves to your own husbands as you do to the Lord” (Ephesians 5:22-33). This gives men the absolute authority of God over their wives and, contrary to what the current sophists bound to the church proverbs 31 (verse in the Bible which describes an ideal woman) think, it is NOT empowering to women, but rather it gives them strict rules to abide by. Laws have often described rape as a crime against the honor of a victim, nullified when a victim marries their attacker (in Italy rape ceased to be a crime against public morality (thus honor) on the 5th of february 1996). This comes from the perceived morality of chastity, and the crime is thus more about the act of penetration than the violation of the woman as a person.
My views
My personal view on morality is “be nice”. Though it may seem childish, this entails not trying to impart negative feelings on others. For what ultimate goal would one do so anyway? Because being nice should feel nice. In this way, being nice would seem more similar to hedonism, where both personal pleasure is increased and harm to others is decreased. I believe the greatest pleasure in the world comes from trying to make others happy, although not to your own detriment. This would include doing small acts of kindness, small sacrifices that ultimately make everyone better off. This requires a severance from traditional morality because while rigid law makes itself as morality, it is not that.
Read more
- Simulacra and simulation – Baudrillard
- The simulacrum of feminine and masculine performance
- The Bible
- The Quran
- The Tora



































